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The Dog That Didn’t Bark?: A Response to Dunne and Gelber’s 
Analysis of RtoP’s Influence on the Intervention in Libya
Introduction
Tim Dunne and Katherine Gelber’s article, ‘Arguing Matters: The Responsibility to Protect 
and the Case of Libya’1 makes a number of claims regarding the role played by the 
Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) in the decision to intervene in Libya, via Security Council (SC) 
Resolution 1973, in March 2011. The authors take issue with my analysis2 of the role played 
by RtoP concluding, ‘This article has challenged the view by Hehir that RtoP played no causal 
role in the Libya action’.3 In this response, I argue that the evidence supplied by Dunne and 
Gelber to reject my analysis – and indeed that of others4 – is based on an unsustainable 
expansion of what constitutes RtoP language, fails to acknowledge the historical evolution of 
human rights-orientated discourse, and exaggerates the extent to which references were made 
to RtoP. 
Dunne and Gelber’s Claims
The authors construct their article around two primary claims; first, ‘moral argumentation 
played a (but not necessarily the decisive) role in bringing about the intervention’ and second, 
‘RtoP failed because those taking action did not maintain consistent argumentation in relation 
to RtoP’.5 The second claim relates to the manner in which the original aim of imposing a no-
fly zone quickly expanded to regime change. The authors argue that as a consequence ‘RtoP 
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has weakened its appeal among sections of the international community’6 and ‘led to Russia’s 
position on the Syrian conflict’.7  While some dispute this claim8 Dunne and Gelber’s 
perspective is one with which I agree, as indeed does Garth Evans9 – and statements from 
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov clearly attest to the 
fall-out from Libya.10 The focus of this response, therefore, is on the first claim made. 
In my article I argued that while the intervention in Libya was understandably 
welcomed by RtoP advocates, there was no evidence that RtoP had influenced the decision to 
intervene. I based this claim on the fact that the international dimension of RtoP was not 
mentioned in either Resolution 1970 or 1973; that RtoP was hardly mentioned in the SC debates 
prior to the Resolution; that none of the key statements made by President Obama, President 
Sarkozy and Prime Minister Cameron justifying the intervention mentioned RtoP; and that all 
the key states involved cited the Arab League statement of the 12th March (which does not 
mention RtoP) as the key causal factor in their decision.11 
Dunne and Gelber, however, counter this by asserting two things; first, that even if the 
term “responsibility to protect” is not mentioned in a particular debate it can still be said to 
have had an influence by virtue of the fact that the use of other terms constitute evidence of the 
concept’s influence on the debate; they state, ‘…people may couch arguments in terms that 
invoke RtoP but may not explicitly use those words…the absence of specific terms [cannot] be 
6
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taken to mean the absence of influence of the RtoP norm on decision making’.12 They claim 
that use of terms like ‘atrocities’, ‘war crimes’, ‘serious violations of humanitarian law’ and 
‘unlawful killing’ – all of which were used in the debate on Libya – constitute evidence of 
RtoP’s influence.13 Elsewhere they argue the use of ‘implicit signifiers such as the use of 
Chapter VII authority, and the description of events as atrocities and international crimes’ also 
evidence RtoP’s efficacy.14 On this understanding of RtoP’s influence they claim, ‘RtoP played 
a significant role in the public debate that occurred up to the passage of Res. 1970 and Res. 
1973…RtoP provided legitimacy for Operation Odyssey Dawn’.15 Secondly, not only did 
people call for action by invoking these “implicit signifiers”, they also claim that there is 
‘…evidence of the use of explicit language of the responsibility to protect’.16 I argue below 
that the first claim constitutes an unsustainable stretching of “RtoP language” which overlooks 
the obvious fact that the terms they claim evidence RtoP’s influence were used long before 
RtoP was even contrived. I dispute the second claim by demonstrating that the invocation of 
the term was only ever fleeting, extremely rare and often simply an afterthought. Additionally, 
the evidence supplied by Dunne and Gelber for “the use of explicit language” at times does not 
stand up to scrutiny.  
“RtoP Language” Prior to RtoP
Many who called for action to halt Qaddafi’s campaign certainly cited a humanitarian 
imperative to act and Dunne and Gelber give many examples.17 This was absolutely not, 
however, the first time such language had been employed and nor is it the case that such 
language has only ever been employed since the RtoP concept was established in 2001. 
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Language related to the need to protect the lives of people in other countries has been 
employed by states – and indeed non-state actors – for centuries. Gary Bass provides many 
examples of this and notes; ‘...emotional pleas were a regular feature of international politics 
throughout much of the nineteenth century, resulting in several important military missions. 
The basic ideas go all the way back to Thucydides’. 18 The idea of using force to protect others, 
many argue, can be seen in particular throughout the history of the just war tradition which 
goes back millennia.19
Leaving aside this long history of calls for military action to protect those suffering 
abroad, the modern era has witnessed a marked increase in human-rights-orientated rhetoric. 
As is well documented, in the immediate post-Cold War era human rights became one of the 
dominant international concerns and related issues were regularly discussed throughout the 
1990s by the SC which came to increasingly express commitments to – and even at times act 
upon – humanitarian concerns.20  Most obviously the wording of Resolution 688 in April 1991 
includes phrases such as, ‘Gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population’, 
‘Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering involved’, ‘Condemns the 
repression of the Iraqi civilian population’ and ‘the plight of the Iraqi civilian population’. 
Likewise Resolution 794 on Somalia in 1992 refers to ‘the magnitude of the human suffering’, 
‘the deterioration of the humanitarian situation’, and ‘widespread violations of international 
humanitarian law’. During the debate on Resolution 794 Russia claimed it had an ‘obligation’ 
to ‘put an end to the human tragedy’ in Somalia.21 These statements very definitely did not 
emerge as a result of RtoP given they predate the concept. 
Two years prior to the ICISS report Kofi Annan gave a landmark speech outlining at 
length the emergence of this new pro-human rights disposition and its journey to the centre of 
18
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SC debates.22 The same year the UN SC passed Resolution 1265 which is replete with 
references to the role of the international community in civilian protection; in particular the 
following phrases stand out; 
Expressing its deep concern at the erosion in respect for international 
humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and principles during armed conflict, 
in particular deliberate acts of violence against all those protected under such 
law…Mindful of the particular vulnerability of refugees and internally displaced 
persons, and reaffirming the primary responsibility of States to ensure their 
protection…Emphasizes the responsibility of States to end impunity and to 
prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and serious 
violations of international humanitarian law…Expresses its willingness to 
respond to situations of armed conflict where civilians are being targeted or 
humanitarian assistance to civilians is being deliberately obstructed, including 
through the consideration of appropriate measures at the Council’s disposal in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
If a resolution which included these phrases were passed today it would likely be heralded as 
evidence of RtoP’s influence if we accept Dunne and Gelber’s attempt to appropriate these 
terms as “implicit signifiers” of RtoP. The fact that this resolution was passed two years before 
the publication of The Responsibility to Protect and six years before the World Summit 
Outcome Document should give us some perspective on the history of the SC’s – at least 
rhetorical – concern with human rights. Indeed, the term “responsibility to protect” had been 
employed by the UNSC before the concept was even recognised at the 2005 World Summit in 
Resolution 1427 passed in 2002. 
RtoP’s lack of rhetorical novelty has been widely noted; for example according to Justin 
Morris, ‘…the UNSC debated action to protect grievously endangered populations long before 
RtoP entered its lexicon’23 while Simon Chesterman wrote, ‘...by the time RtoP was endorsed 
by the World Summit in 2005, its normative content had been emasculated to the point where 
22
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it essentially provided that the SC could authorize, on a case-by-case basis, things that it had 
been authorizing for more than a decade’.24 
The rationale advanced by Dunne and Gelber – the near complete absence of any 
references to the term during the debate on Libya should not obscure us to RtoP’s influence 
because the use of terms employed long before RtoP was established are evidence of its 
influence – is clearly dubious. This language may cohere with the spirit of RtoP but a causal 
link by definition – given the time-sequencing – cannot be established. 
Additionally, while the use of terms related to human rights protection may have 
increased we should be careful not to conflate rhetorical usage with real policy change. States 
have, many times, articulated the most effusive commitments whilst actually behaving in very 
obviously contradictory ways. For example during the 2009 General Assembly debate on RtoP 
Sudan declared it supported 
…the legal duties of a sovereign State to protect its citizens or population from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. These duties 
are conferred on the sovereign State by what is known in political philosophy 
jurisprudence as the social contract between the governed and the governor or 
between the crown and its subjects.25 
Yet, the government’s actual treatment of its citizens in Darfur was described by the UN as a 
‘reign of terror’ and widely recognised as one of the most egregious state-sponsored atrocities 
in the modern era.26 
Of direct relevance to the Libya case is the Arab League’s statement on the 12th March 
which is widely recognised as having caused a dramatic ‘sea-change’ in thinking on how to 
respond.27 Many of RtoP’s most vocal proponents have accepted that the statement was the 
24
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primary catalyst for the decision by the US – specifically President Obama – to take action, 
and for the Russian and Chinese decisions to abstain.28 The Arab League statement declares; 
Affirming the necessity to respect international humanitarian law and the call for 
an end to the crimes against the Libyan people…[We act] to ensure the right of the 
Libyan people to fulfil their demands and build their own future and institutions in 
a democratic framework’.29
While this statement employs the language Dunne and Gelber credit to RtoP’s influence, it is 
difficult not to find the sentiments jarring when one looks at the human rights records and 
totalitarian nature of the states in the Arab League.30 Additionally, two days after issuing this 
effusive commitment to human rights and democracy, the Gulf Cooperation Council – whose 
six members are all in the Arab League – sent troops from Saudi Arabia and Qatar into Bahrain 
to help the Khalifa Monarchy crush protesters calling for democratic change.31 The crackdown 
was condemned by human rights organisations as brutally excessive32, yet the international 
community essentially ignored the situation; the SC has never mentioned Bahrain in either a 
resolution or a Presidential statement. According to The Bahrain Centre for Human Rights; ‘the 
authorities in Bahrain, due to the lack of international consequences, have no incentive to stop 
the human rights violations’ which they argue have continued for the past three years.33 The 
Bahrain Centre for Human Rights are unlikely to consider the fact that human-rights-orientated 
language found its way into Arab League statements anything other than grossly hypocritical. 
28
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“Use of Explicit Language of the Responsibility to Protect”?
In addition to the “implicit signifiers” Dunne and Gelber argue the debate over Libya showed 
‘evidence of the use of explicit language of the responsibility to protect’.34 They conclude their 
article in fact by stating, ‘Given the extent of the use of explicit RtoP language in the statements 
and justifications of key-state and non-state based actors, it is difficult to agree with Hehir’.35
During the debate which preceded Resolution 1973 some NGOs used the term “responsibility 
to protect”, as did UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, but the authors fail 
to demonstrate a causal link between this usage and the actual decisions made beyond vague 
allusions to these utterances helping to ‘frame the debate’.36 In the course of any crisis many 
actors will articulate a variety of views but to argue that one in particular – in this case that 
which called for action by explicitly invoking RtoP – framed the debate demands more than 
just evidence of its use; it requires proof in the form of statements made by the key states who 
pushed for the intervention attesting to their decision being “framed” by R2P; Dunne and 
Gelber do not provide any such evidence because it does not exist. China and Russia both 
explained that they abstained on the vote due to the statement made by the Arab League; neither 
cited RtoP.37 Additionally the key architects of the intervention never once referred to RtoP in 
their public statements on why they were taking action.38 Likewise, Morris’s analysis of the 
factors which influenced the UK to support the intervention against Libya found that RtoP 
played no significant role at all. He notes that the UK Defence Committee’s report on Libya 
34
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affords no importance to RtoP in the decision to act and references to the term were added to 
the report, according to the Chair of the Committee, ‘as an afterthought’.39 
There is some truth to Dunne and Gelber’s claim  that certain states explicitly used the 
term during the debates on Resolutions 1970 and 1973; regarding Resolution 1970 both the 
French and Colombian representatives used variants of the term but these were the only two 
states to do so. Dunne and Gelber claim, however, ‘The UK’s representative…made it clear 
that the package of sanctions agreed in Res. 1970 evidenced that the Council was standing by 
the Libyan people and in so doing, exercising its international responsibility to protect’.40 In 
fact the UK representative does not at any point in his statement mention RtoP. 
With respect to Resolution 1973 Dunne and Gelber assert;
In their statements to the Council both those who voted in favour of the resolution 
and those who abstained invoked the responsibility to protect civilians, thus 
demonstrating a broad consensus that this was the overriding purpose of Res. 
1973.41 
In fact only three states “invoked” RtoP; France and Colombia simply reiterated that Resolution 
1970 had reminded the Libyan authorities that they had a responsibility to protect, while South 
Africa stated the resolution demonstrated the SC was ‘acting responsibly to protect’ people in 
Libya. No other references to the term occurred; the claim “both those who voted in favour of 
the resolution and those who abstained invoked the responsibility to protect” is simply not true. 
If anything the Chinese statement is quite an explicit rejection of the basic idea 
underpinning RtoP; while initially expressing its desire to ‘halt acts of violence against citizens’ 
the statement continues, 
China has always emphasized that, in its relevant actions, the Security Council 
should follow the United Nations Charter and the norms governing international 
law, respect the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Libya 
39
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and resolve the current crisis in Libya through peaceful means. China is always 
against the use of force in international relations’.42
Dunne and Gelber’s claim that those who abstained ‘chose to couch their reasoning in 
terminology that reflected the mandate of RtoP’43 has scant basis in the actual statement China 
issued. The authors quote the Russian statement which claims that Russia is ‘a consistent and 
firm advocate…of the protection of the civilian population’.44 This description of Russia – a 
state whose internal human rights record, active support for oppressive regimes, and aggressive 
disposition towards its neighbours – strains credulity, though the SC is not a forum renowned 
for the honest self-appraisal of its members. That Russia would present itself in such terms may 
induce derision but it’s hardly surprising; that Dunne and Gelber would proffer this as evidence 
to back up there case that language matters is, however, somewhat extraordinary. Arguing 
matters of course, but in the course of analysing arguments and debates we surely cannot be 
expected to believe blatant lies. 
With respects to the US they claim, ‘In a detailed first-hand account, Obama is said to 
have invoked the US’ endorsement of an international responsibility to protect’.45 The source 
cited for this “detailed first-hand account” is an article in Vanity Fair by Michael Lewis. At no 
point in the article, however, does the author mention RtoP and there is certainly no reference 
to the President having “invoked the US’s endorsement of an international responsibility to 
protect”.  
There is, therefore, scant basis for the claim that the debates on Resolutions 1970 and 
1973 demonstrate ‘evidence of the use of explicit language of the responsibility to protect’.46 
This is also reflected in Paul Williams’ analysis of the key issues which informed the debates 
42
 UNSC, ‘Security Council 6498th Meeting’, S/PV.6498, 17 March 2011, p. 10. 
43
 Dunne and Gelber, ‘Arguing Matters: The Responsibility to Protect and the Case of Libya’,  p. 344
44
 Ibid,  p. 343
45
 Ibid,  p. 341
46
 Ibid,  p. 339
at the SC which does not include RtoP.47 Likewise Morris’ analysis of the debates uncovers 
negligible evidence of the terms invocation. Importantly, Morris – like Dunne and Gelber – 
adopts a methodological approach which accepts that phrases linked to the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document – such as “mass atrocity prevention/response” – should also be taken as 
evidence of RtoP’s use. Yet, even with this generous approach he concludes ‘no UNSC 
members actually resorted to such language’.48 He highlights that during the ten publicly 
recorded meetings between February 2011 and May 2013 at which the Council discussed 
Libya, explicit or clear references to RtoP were made by only six Council members and 
concludes, ‘Having been clearly reminded of their obligations, the majority of UNSC member 
states chose not to draw on such language in justifying their approaches to the crisis in Libya’.49 
In the conclusion the authors claim, ‘Even if this argumentation [about RtoP] was used 
to hide other unspecified reasons for the use of force, it is still the case that once deployed into 
the public sphere it mattered’.50 This, therefore, suggests that even if we can conclusively 
determine that the use of RtoP language – however generously one interprets this – was actually 
a cynical ploy, this does not undermine the influence of RtoP; this is essentially an admission 
that RtoP can constitute an effective ruse. 
Dunne and Gelber argue that since the 2005 World Summit ‘RtoP has increasingly 
informed responses to humanitarian crises around the world’.51 The evidence to back up this 
claim – as per their analysis of Libya – is instances when the term, and derivatives ostensibly 
indicative of it, have been employed. This argument coheres with a more pervasive trend in the 
literature supportive of RtoP whereby the efficacy of the concept is deemed to stem from the 
47
 Paul Williams (2011) ‘The Road to Humanitarian War in Libya’, Global Responsibility to Protect, 3:2, pp. 
256–258.
48
 Morris, ‘Libya and Syria: RtoP and the Spectre of the Swinging Pendulum’, p. 1267
49
 Ibid, pp. 1272-1273
50
 Dunne and Gelber, ‘Arguing Matters: The Responsibility to Protect and the Case of Libya’, p. 348
51
 Ibid, p. 329
frequency with which the term is used.52 Indicatively, in September 2014 the Global Centre for 
R2P triumphantly published a list of every SC Resolution which mentions “responsibility to 
protect”.53 Yet, just counting references to a concept tells us very little; how many resolutions 
have, for example, included references to “peace”, “equality”, “justice”, “human dignity”, 
“disarmament” etc. which have actually been motivated by a genuine commitment to these 
principles and/or led to actual action undertaken to uphold them? There is a need, surely, for 
analysis, comparative reflection and evidence that these references to RtoP are more than just 
‘high sounding tokenism’.54 For example, the 26 SC resolutions which mention RtoP evidence 
a very clear trend; 22 refer exclusively to the host state’s responsibility. Though the other four 
at least acknowledge the existence of the external responsibility – only, it must be said, insofar 
as they mention paragraphs 138 and 139 – none explains what this entails, how it is collectively 
understood, or the circumstances under which it can be operationalized. Does this suggest then 
that RtoP is being employed exclusively in terms of Pillar I and thus a means by which the 
international “responsibility to protect” is obscured/avoided? In which case the use of the term 
in SC resolutions could well signify a negative trend for those who wish to see greater SC 
engagement with intra-state atrocities. 
As I have argued elsewhere55, if the solution to improving the international response to 
intra-state humanitarian crises was getting states and the SC to use terms related to the 
protection of human rights and express their commitment to coordinated international efforts 
to prevent or halt egregious violations of human rights, then this would have been solved 
through both the 1948 Genocide Convention and the routine iteration of “never again” 
thereafter. The Genocide Convention, however, became, according to Kofi Anna, ‘a dead 
52
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letter’56 while “never again” has arguably become one of the most degraded terms in 
international political discourse, one which, when uttered, catalyses infinitely more cynicism 
than it does action. 
Conclusion
The idea that the intervention in Libya was ‘consistent with “the responsibility to protect” 
framework’57 is not really controversial. My point is not that the intervention was not - to some 
extent - inspired or justified by a desire to halt or prevent crimes against humanity. The 
intervention coheres with the spirit of RtoP, but also with, for example, Biblical scripture; the 
fact that an action coheres with a theory, doctrine or prescription does not in itself constitute 
evidence of any causal link. Rather, my argument is that RtoP did not play a causal role in the 
decision to intervene. This is a potentially crucial finding as if it is the case that the manner in 
which the international community – and specifically the SC – responds to intra-state 
humanitarian crises is the same post-RtoP as it was pre-RtoP then the concept’s efficacy is 
obviously compromised. The language that is cited as evidence of RtoP’s influence on the 
discourse is language that was used long before RtoP was even conceived. Pre-RtoP there were 
a number of SC Resolutions and indeed interventions which cohered with the ethos 
underpinning RtoP, but they were erratically invoked.58 It was precisely this inconsistent record 
in the 1990s which led to RtoP.
Dunne and Gelber’s argument is replete with concessions and caveats which when 
combined produce a convoluted defence comprising a succession of elaborate explanations 
based on tenuous assumptions which is increasingly distant from the actual facts. These 
include;
56
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• RtoP had an influence on the debate but you won’t identify it if you just look for 
instances of the terms use.59
• The use of terms - “implicit signifiers” - which have been used long before RtoP was 
conceived are evidence of RtoP’s influence.60  
• It may be that those using the term and its associated “implicit signifiers” don’t 
understand these terms.61
• It may be that those using the term and its associated “implicit signifiers” don’t have a 
shared understanding of these terms.62
• It may be that use the term and its associated “implicit signifiers” are employed purely 
as rhetorical cover for nefarious intentions.63
• It can’t be determined whether the use of the term and its associated “implicit signifiers” 
had a causal role on the decision to intervene.64
The net result, surely, is a defence of RtoP’s influence which is inherently tenuous. 
The principle of ‘Occam’s Razor’ holds that among competing hypotheses the one with 
the least number of assumptions should be deemed most likely to be true; this is often simplified 
to “the simplest explanation is invariably the most accurate”. The SC debate on Libya included 
paltry references to RtoP and even the “implicit signifiers”; surely the simplest explanation 
then is that RtoP was not a factor in the decision-making process? With respects to Libya RtoP 
is, therefore, the “dog that didn’t bark”; an expected fact absent from the record.
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